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The Tuskegee study of un- 
treated syphilis in the N e p  male is 
, the longest nontherapeutic experi- 
ment on human beings in medical his- 
tory. The strategies used to remit 
and retah participants were quite 
similar to those being advocated for 
HIVIAIDS prevention programs to- 
day. h o s t  60 years after the study 
began, there raTlains a trail of d i  
and suspicion that hampers HN ed- 
ucation effortsinBlack communities. 
The AIDS epidemic has ex- 
posed the  usk keg& study as a his- 
torical marker for the legitimate dis- 
content of Blacks with the public 
health system. The belief that AIDS 
is a form of genocide is rooted in a 
social context in which Black Amer- 
icans, faced with persistent inequal- 
ity, believe in conspiracy theories 
about Whites against Blacks. These 
theories range from the belief that the 
government promotes drug abuse in 
Black communities to the belief that 
HIV is a manmade weapon of racial 
warfare. 
An open and honest discussion 
of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study can 
facilitate the process of rebuilding 
. trust between the Black community 
and public health authorities. This di- 
alogue can contribute to the develop 
Gent of HIV education prognms that 
are scientifically sound, culturally 
sensitive, and ethnically acceptable. 
(Am 3 Public Hen& 1991;81:1498- 
1504) 
AIDS Among Black Americans 
Since acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS) was first recognized 
and reported in 1981, more than 179 000 
persons with AIDS have been reported to 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Of 
these, more than 63% have died. Infection 
with the human immunodeficiency virus 
(t-TTV) has emerged as a leading cause of 
death among men and women under 45 
years of age and children 1 to 5 years of 
age.' 
By May 1991, there were 179 136 
cases of AIDS reported in the United 
States. Of the reported cases, 97 329 
(54%) were White and 51 190 (29%) were 
Black. Thus, although Whites still consti- 
tute a majority of the AlDS cases, Blacks 
are contracting AIDS in numbers far 
greater than their relative percentage in 
the population (Blacks constitute 12% of 
the US population). In addition, 52% of all 
children (under age 13 at time of diagnosis) 
and 52% of all women with AIDS are 
Black.' The best data available demon- 
ism in the United States has contributed to 
the present social environment, in which 
those Blacks, whose behavior places them 
at greater risk for HIV infection, are also 
among the most disadvantaged members 
of our society. As we enter the last decade 
of the 20th century, the promises of o p  
portunity and equality envisioned by the 
civil rights movement have failed to be 
realized for the vast majority of American 
Blacks. Blacks' consequent anger and de- 
spair in the face of penistent inequality 
have contributed to the development of 
conspiracy theories about Whites (the 
government) against Blacks. These con- 
spiracy theories range from the belief that 
the government promotes drug abuse in 
Black communities to the belief that HIV 
is a manmade weapon of racial warfare. 
For example, The Nation of Islam 
has disseminated literature that describes 
AIDS as a fonnof genocide, an attempt by 
White society to eliminate the Negro 
race.' The mainstream Black media have 
also contributed to the discussion. "Tony 
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Brown's Journal," a popular Public 
Broadcast System television show, aired a 
series of programs debating the issue of  
AIDS as a form of genocide. The Los An- 
geles Sentinel, the largest Black newspa- 
per on the West Coast, ran a series of 
stories beghning March 9, 1989, suggest- 
ing that Blacks had been intentionally in- 
fected with HTV. Essence also ran a story 
titled "AIDS: Is It Genocide?", In that 
article, Barbara J.  Justice, MD, a New 
York City physician, asserted that "there 
is a possibility that the virus was produced 
to limit the number of Ahcan  people and 
people of color in the world who are no 
longer needed" (p. 78). James Small, PhD, 
a Black studies instructor at City College 
of New York, was quoted as saying: 
Our whole relationship to Whites has 
been that of their practicing genocidal 
conspiratorial behavior on us from the 
whole slave encounter up to the Tuske- 
gee Study. People make it sound nice by 
saying the Tuskegee "Study." But do 
you know how many thousands and 
thousands of our people died of syphilis 
because of that?] 
The history of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, with its failure to educate the par- 
ticipants and treat them adequately, 
helped to lay the foundation for Blacks' 
pervasive sense of distrust of public health 
authorities today. Fears about genocide 
have been reported by public health pro- 
fessionals and communi ty-based-  
organization s t d w h o  work in Blackcom- 
munities. During his 1990 testimony 
before the National Commission on  
AIDS, Mark Smith, MD, from the School 
of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University 
in Baltimore, described the Mean Amer- 
ican community as "already alienated 
born the health care system and the gov- 
ernment and . . . somewhat cynical about 
the motives of those who arrive in their 
communities to help them" (p. 19)..' Smith 
said that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
"provides validation for common suspi- 
cions about the ethical even-handedness 
in the medical research establishment and 
in the federal government, in particular, 
when it comes to Black people" (p. 20)' 
Harlon Dalton. assoc~ate professor of 
law at Yale Universiry and member of the 
National Commission on AIDS, elo- 
quently describes the social basis for 
genocidal theories in his much quoted es- 
say, ''AIDS in Blackface."' Dalton be- 
lieves that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study is 
a reflection of society's historical disre- 
gard for the lives of Black people. He ac- 
cepts the commonly repsated distortion 
that "the government purposefully es -  
posed Black men to syphilis so as to study 
the natural course of the disease."' 
The continuing legacy of the Tuske- 
gee Syphilis Study has contributed to 
Blacks' belisf that genocide is possible and 
that public health authorities cannot be 
trusted. These fears and attitudes must be 
assessed in order to develop AIDS edu- 
cation programs for the Blackcornmunity. 
For example, the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC), a leading 
civil rights organization founded by Dr 
Martin Luther King, Jr, received funding 
From the CDC to provide HTV education 
through a national propam titled RACE 
(Reducing PJDS through Community Ed- 
ua ion ) .  In 1990, the SCLC conducted a 
survey to determine HTV education needs 
among 1056 Blackchurch members in five 
cities (Atlanta, Ga; Charlotte, NC; De- 
troit, Mich; Kansas City, Mo; and Tus- 
caloosa, Ala). While 35% of the respon- 
dents believed that AIDS is a form of 
genocide, another 30% were unsure. Ad- 
ditionally, 44% believed that the govern- 
ment is not telling the truth about AIDS, 
while 35% were unsure. Furthermore, 
34% believed that AIDS is a manmade 
virus, while 41% were unsure.Z0 
The results of the SCLC survey 
strongly suggest that Blacks' belief in 
AIDS as a form of genocide and their rnis- 
trust of the government should be cause 
for serious concern among public health 
officials. Within this context, the health 
professionals responsible for HIV educa- 
tion must be made aware of the history of 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and its im- 
plications for HIV education and AIDS 
risk reduction programs in Black commu- 
nities. Unfortunately, the details of the 
Tuskegee study are not well known. 
Therefore, we utilize the work of historian 
James Jones, who provides the most com- 
prehensive description of the Tuskegee 
study in his book, Bad Blood The Tuske- 
gee Syphilis Qeriment--a Tragedy of 
Race and Medicine. 
Facrors Leading ro the Trukegee 
Syphilis SruLj, 
The Julius Rosenwald Fund. a phil- 
anthropicorganization in Chicago, Ill, was 
dedicated to the promotion of the health, 
education, and welfare of Black Ameri- 
cans. In 1928. the fund's director of med- 
ical service approached the United States 
Public Health Serwce (PHs) in an effort to 
expand activities to improve rhe health 
status of Blacks in the rural South. At that 
tune the PHs had successfully completed 
a study of the prevalence of  syphilis in 
over ZOOO Blacks employed by the Delta 
Pine and Land Company in Mississippi. 
Twenty-five percent of the sample had 
tested positive for syphilis. The PHs  col- 
laborated with the Rosenwald Fund to 
provide treatment to these people. It was 
the success of this collaboration that led 
the P H s  to submit a proposal to the 
Rosenwald Fund for expansion of syphilis 
control demonstration programs into five 
counties in the rural South. The Rosen- 
wald Fund approved the proposal with the 
condition that a Black public health nurse 
be employed on the project.6.7 
From 1929 to 1931, the Rosenwald 
Fund sponsored syphilis control demon- 
stration projects in Albemarle County, 
Virginia; Glynn County, Georgia; Pitt 
County, North Carolina; Macon County, 
Alabama; and Tipton County, Tennessee. 
The primary goal was to demonstrate that 
rural Blacks could be tested and treated 
for syphilis. During the testing phase of 
the study, it was found that in Macon 
County, Alabama, 35% to 40% of all age 
groups tested were positive for syphilis.6.7 
Before the treatment phase of the project 
could begh, two things happened that led 
to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 
Fist ,  there was much speculation in 
the scientific literature on racial differ- 
ences in the natural history of syphilis. 
Although some theories suggested that 
syphilis affected the neurological func- 
tioning of whites, there was speculation 
that latent syphilis had an impact on the 
cardiovascular systems of Blacks. How- 
ever, Dr Bruusgaard in Oslo, Norway, 
conducted a retrospective study of white 
men with untreated syphilis which found 
that cardiovascular damage was common 
and neurological involvement was rare. 
This finding, published in 1929, was con- 
trary to the prevailing scientificview in the 
United States.6 
Second, the start of the Depression in 
1929 devastated the Rosenwald Fund's fi- 
nancial resources, which were needed for 
the treatment component of the demon- 
stration project. Without financial support 
from the Rosenwald Fund, the PHs  sim- 
ply did not have the resources to develop 
treatment programs in all five counties. It 
was thought that the best chance of sal- 
vaging anything of value from the project 
lay in the conduct of a scientfic e.qeri- 
ment. 
Conflict between finding from the 
Oslo study and the prevailing scientfic 
view in the U.S. on racial differences led 
Taliafeno Clark, M.D., of the PHs, to 
propose that a major improvement on pre- 
vious syphilis research could be obtained 
by conducting a prospective study of liv- 
ing patients. Consequently, in 1932, Dr 
Clark stated that "the Alabama commu- 
nity offered an unparalleled opportunity 
for the study of the effect of untreated 
syphilis" @. 94).6 
The original study population con- 
sisted of 399 Black men with syphilis and 
201 controls. The study was intended to 
last for 6 to 9 months. However, as  Jones 
demonstrates, the drive to satisfy scien- 
tific curiosity resulted in a 40-year exper- 
iment that followed these men to "end 
point" (autopsy). Jones eloquently de- 
scribes the irony of the Tuskeeee Syphilis 
Study: 
I 
[The] srudy would be an expression of 
concern for Negro health problems, 
keepins the PHs involved as a vital 
force in promotine medical attention to 
Blacks. The more darnagjng the disease 
was shown to be. the more pressure 
would build on Southern legislaton to 
fund treatment programs. The study 
would also permit the PHs to maintain 
the momentum of public health work in 
Alabama by continuing the close work- 
ing relationships wirh srate and local 
health officiais. not to mention Black 
leaders at the Tuskegee Institute (p. 
94) .h 
Edttorial cartoon by Lou Erikson, The Atlanta Condftuffon, July 1972. Reprinted with 
permission. 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
Strategies Used to Recruit and 
Track Pam'c@ants 
The 40-year continuation of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Smdy can be atmbuted 
to extensive collaboration among govem- 
ment agencies, along with an unprece- 
dented community-based approach that 
demonstrated a degree of cultural sensitiv- 
ity toward the poor Black target population 
in Macon County. The strategies used to 
recruit and retain participants in the study 
were quite similar to those being actvmted 
for HIV education and AIDS risk reduc- 
tion programs today. In addition to the 
PHs, which sewed as the lead agncy,  
there was an impressive group of cooper- 
ating agencies born state and local levels: 
Macon County Medical Society 
Tuskegee Institute 
Alabama State and Macon County 
Boards of Health 
The Miibank Memorial Fund 
local Black churches and public 
schools 
local plantanon owners 
During the  ear^ phase of the project. 
the PHs decided to ask Tuskegee Institute 
to participate in the study. It was felt that 
because Tuskegee Institute had a history 
of service to Blacks in Macon County, its 
participation would not threaten white 
physicians in the county. Furthermore, 
the PHs felt that the use of Black physi- 
cians was necessary to facilitate the coop- 
eration of subjects.6 Tuskegee Institute 
benefited from this collaboration by re- 
ceiving funds, training opportunities for 
interns, and employment for its nurses. 
Jones describes the complex political ma- 
neuvers involved in setting up the s t ~ @ :  
[By persuading the Tuskegee Institute 
phys~aans to cooperate], the old syph- 
ilis control demonstration tern of [PHS] 
clinicians would be reunited and the 
study would have the appearance of a 
revival of syphilis control work. The 
true purpose of the experiment would be 
totally obscured, leaving investigators 
free to trade upon the goodwill and trust 
that the Rosenwald Fund's syphilis con- 
trol demonstration had generated 
among the Black people of the county 
and their white employers. Dr. Clark 
was not the least bit embarrassed by the 
deceit. (p. 100)6 
The study included culturally sensi- 
tive grassroots approaches to ensure the 
involvement and continued participation 
of the men. The study employed Eunice 
Rivers, a Black public health nurse &om 
Macon County, throughout the entire 40 
years. As the primary contact penon, she 
provided transportation, organized the 
men for examinations by the visiting PHs 
physicians, provided reassurance, and 
formed trusting relationships with the men 
and their families.8 
The PHs was e.memeiy successful 
in enlisting Black church leaders, elders in 
the community, and plantation owners to 
encourage participation. The plantation 
owners had an economic incentive to 
maintain the health of their employees. 
Often they would give permission for 
medical examinations while workers 
toiled in the fields.' In addition, physical 
examinations, including the taking of 
blood samples, were conducted in Black 
churches and schools. Jones describes the 
process through which subjects were re- 
cruired: "First the health officials won 
over  local leaders. Then, they used 
schoolhouses and churches as makeshift 
clinics, wirh local schoolteachen and rnin- 
isters serving as 'advance people' who 
spread the word about where and when 
the 'government doctors' would be in the 
area" (p. 6 9 J . h  
In addition, the fact that Whites ruled 
Blacks in Macon County, coupled with 
the Black men's extreme poverty and al- 
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most total lack of access to health care, 
made the men willing subjects. As Dr 
Frost, a Black physician from the Rosen- 
wald Fund, stated, "as a group, they were 
susceptible to kindne~s."~ 
Lack of medical care in Macon 
Counry meant that many of the study par- 
ticipants had never been treated by a phy- 
sician. The PHs physicians, believing that 
their patients would not understand clini- 
cal terms, did not even attempt to educate 
them about syphilis. Parricipants were not 
informed that they suffered £rom a spe- 
cific, definable disease that was conta- 
gious and transmitted through sexual in- 
tercourse. Nor were they told that the 
disease could be transmitted from mother 
to fetus. The PHs clinicians translated 
medical terms into local language. Syphi- 
lis became "bad blood," a phrase that 
Black people of the rural South used to 
describe a variery of ailmer~ts.~ Conse- 
quently, when the PHs physicians an- 
nounced that they had come to test for 
"bad blood," people turned out in droves. 
The PHS also used incentives including 
free physical examinations, food, and 
transportation.5 Burial stipends, provided 
by the Milbank Memorial Fund, were 
used to gain permission from family mem- 
bers for autopsies to be performed on 
study participants who reached "end 
point."6 
From the historical and social per- 
spective of the nual South in the early 
1930s, the PHs strategies represented a 
high degree of understanding about the 
cultural milieu in which the study was be- 
ing conducted. There is no doubt the a g  
proach was a sophisticated demonstration 
of cultural sensitivity coupled with politi- 
cal sawy and an impressive commitment 
by collaborating agencies. However, the 
tragedy was that a project originally in- 
tended to meet real health needs ended in 
a mere attempt to saivage scientific data. 
How Did Ir Go on for so Long? 
The Tuskegee study of untreated 
syphilis in the N e ~ o  male is the longest 
nontherapeutic experiment on human be- 
ings in medical h i~tory .~  Numerous fac- 
tors contributed to the continuation of this 
e,xperirnent over a period of 40 years. 
However, almost From the outset, its sci- 
enthc merit was questionable. 
The Alabama state health officer and 
the Macon Counry Board of Health ex- 
tracted a promise kom the PHs that all 
who were tested and found to be positive 
for syplulis, including those selected for 
the study, would receive treament. Itwas 
understood by all, except the subjects, 
that the treatment given was less than the 
amount recomrnended by the PHs to cure 
syphilis. By the late 19305 some physi- 
cians began to raise concerns regarding 
the scientific merit of a study about un- 
treated syphilis when it was clear that 
some subjects had received some form of 
treatment. In 1938, removal of these men 
from the experiment was briefly consid- 
ered, but it was decided that in the interest 
of maintaining esprit de corps among the 
participants and in order to avoid suspi- 
cion, those men who had received mini- 
mal treatment would remain in the exper- 
imental group.6 
The ultimate tragedy of the Tuskegee 
experiment was exemplified by the ex- 
traordinary measures taken to ensure that 
s u b c t s  in the experimental group did not 
receive effective treatment. During World 
War 11, approximately 50 of the syphilitic 
cases received letters bom the local draft 
board ordering them to take treatment. At 
the request of the PHs, the draft board 
agreed to exclude the men in the study 
£rom its list of draftees needing treatment.6 
According to Jones, 
[Preventing] the men from receiving 
treatment had always been a violation of 
Alabama's public health sraruta requir- 
ing public reporring and prompt treat- 
ment of venereal diseases . . . . Under 
the auspices of the law health officials 
conducted the largest state-level testing 
and treatment program in the history of 
the nation [but] state and local health 
officials continued tocooperate with the 
study @. 17Q6 
In 1943, the PHS began to administer 
penicillin to syphilitic patients in selected 
treatment clinics across the nation. The 
men of the Tuskegee Syph.dis Study were 
excluded from this treament for the same 
reason other drugs had been withheld 
since the beginning of the srudy in 1932- 
treatment would end the study. Once pen- 
icillin became the standard of treatment 
for syphilis in 1951, the PHs insisted that 
it was all the more urgent for the Tuskegee 
study to continue because "it made the 
erperirnent a never-again-to-be-repeated 
opportunity (p. 179).6 
In 1952, in an effo'on to reach subjects 
who had moved out of Macon Countv, the 
PHs utdized its entire national network of 
state and local health depanments for the 
first time in its histov in order to bring 
subjects in for examination. Over the nem 
20 years, state and lccal health depan- 
ments cooperated in keeping the men in 
the study, yet denying treatment. 
According to Jones, the ultimate rea- 
son why the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
went on for 40 years was a minimal sense 
of personal responsibility and ethical con- 
cern among the small group of men within 
the PHs who controlled the study. This 
attitude was reflected in a !976 interview 
conducted by Jones with Dr John Heller, 
Director of Venereal Diseases at the PHs 
from 1943 to 1948, who stated, "The 
men's status did not warrant ethical de- 
bate. They were subjects, not patients; 
clinical material, not sick people" (p. 
179).6 
Jones details the following chronol- 
ogy of events leading to the end of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study: 
November 1966. Peter Buxtun, a 
venereal disease interviewer and in- 
vestigator with the PHs in San 
Francisco, sent a letter to Dr 
W i a m  Brown, Director of the Di- 
vision of Venereal Diseases, to ex- 
press his moral concerns about the 
experiment. He inquired whether 
any of the men had been treated 
and whether any had been 
told the nature of the study. 
November 1968. Buxtun wrote Dr 
Brown a second letter, in which he 
described the current racial unrest 
prevalent in the nation. Buxtun 
made the point that "the racial com- 
position of the study group (100% 
Negro] supported the thinking of 
Negro militants that Negroes have 
long been used for medical experi- 
ments and teaching cases in the 
emergency wards of county hospi- 
tals. . ." (p. 193).6 Dr Brown 
showed this letter to the Director of 
the Centers for Disease Control. 
For the first time, health officials 
saw the experiment as a public re- 
lations problem that could have se- 
vere political repercussions. 
February 1969. The CDC convened 
a biue-ribbon panel to discuss the 
Tuskegee study. The group re- 
viewed all aspects of the experiment 
and decided against treating the 
men. This decision ended debate on 
the Tuskegee study's future: It 
would continue until "end point." 
The committee also recommended 
that a major thrust be made to up- 
grade the study scientifically. 
In the final analysis, it was Peter 
B m n  who stopped the Tuskegee 
Syphdis Study by telling hls stor?, to 
a reporter with the Associated 
Press. On July 25, 1972, the Wash- 
ington .%'or ran a front-page story 
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I From Thomas Parran's book, Shadow on the Land? I 
about the experiment. It is irnpor- 
tant to note that the P H s  was still 
conducting the experiment on the 
day when the story broke. 
The story was picked up off the wire 
service and became front-page news and 
the subject of editorials in major newspa- 
pers across the nation. It did not take long 
for oficials in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) and the 
PHS to form a chorus of denunciation in 
concen with the public outcry condemn- 
ing the srudy. Little effort was made di- 
rectly to defend or just@ the experiment. 
For example. Dr Donald Printz, an official 
in [he Venereal Disease Branch of the 
CDC, publicly stated that the e'xperiment 
was "airnost like genocide . . . a Literal 
death sentence was passed on some of 
those people" @. 207).6 
Implications for HIVIAIDS Risk 
Redzurion Programs in the 
Blnck Community 
The historic 1972 disclosure of the 
Tuskegee study in the national press led to 
congressional subcommittee hearings 
held in February and March of 1973 by 
Senator Edward Kennedy. The result was 
a complete revamping of HEW re@la- 
tions on protection of human subjects in 
e,xpenmentation. On July 23, 1973 a 51.8 
bfion class-action law suit was filed in the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District 
of Alabama on behalf of the men in the 
study. In December 1974, the government 
agreed to pay $10 million in an out-of- 
court settlement. Jones provides a de- 
tailed description of the law suit conse- 
quences.6 
There has been relatively little dis- 
cussion of the Tuskegee Experiment 
within the public health professional liter- 
ature since the historic 1972 disclosure of 
the study in the national press. For exam- 
ple, Cutler and Arnold's 1988 article titled 
"Venereal Disease Control by Health De- 
partments in the Past: Lessonsfor the Pres- 
ent"l0 failed to make any mention of the 
Tuskegee study yet called upon readers of 
this journal to honor Surgeon General Par- 
ran who at one point directed the study. 
Silver described this omission as evidence 
of the continued inability to conkont our 
racist past. Silver went on to state that 
. . . the behavior of the PHs oficers was 
no more than representative of rhe sen- 
timents and prejudices of the times. Bur 
not to remember is to forget, and to for- 
get is a disservice ro those who suffered 
the indignities. . . [In] calling upon us to 
honor [Parran], one of the panicipants, 
we should also mention the a n t e x  in 
which the meritorious service was 
earned." 
Both Brandtl2 and Feel3 emphasize 
the importance of history in the cultural 
meaning of disease. Therefore, as the pat- 
tern of HIV infection shifts and increasing 
numbers of Blacks are affected, it will be 
crucial to understand the historical con- 
text in which Black Americans will inter- 
pret the disease. The failure of public 
health professionals to comprehensively 
discuss the Tuskegee experiment contrib- 
utes to its use as a source of misinforma- 
tion and helps to maintain a barrier be- 
tween the Black community and health 
care service providers. In presentations at 
public health professional meetings and 
interactions with Black community- 
based-organization staff members, the XI- 
thors have consistentty observed how the 
Tuskegee Study is used to undermine trust 
and justify AIDS conspiracy theories. Al- 
thor~gh thcrr. is no evidence to support 
Dalton's assertion that the men were in- 
tentionally infected with syphilis,: this db-  
tortion continues to be disseminated 
through community discussions and the 
popular media. There is no need to mis- 
represent the facts of the study to recog- 
nize how ir contributes to fears of geno- 
cide. Given that the conduct of the study 
demonsuated little regard for the lives of 
the men who participated. i t  is no surprise 
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that Blacks today do not readily dismiss 
assertions that HIT is a manmade virus 
intentionally allowed to run rampant in 
thcir communities. 
Now, almost 60 years after the es- 
pzriment began, the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Stu@'s legacy is a trail of distrust and 
suspicion chat hampers HIV education ef- 
fons in Black communities. During testi- 
mony delivered before the National Com- 
mission on AIDS in December 1990, 
Alpha Thomas. a health educator with the 
Dallas Urban League: stated: "So many 
&can American people that I work with 
do not trust hospitals or any of the other 
community health care service providers 
because of that Tuskegee Experiment. It 
is like . . . if they did it then they will do  it 
again" (p. 43).1 
Public health professionals must rec- 
oenize that Blacks' belief in AIDS as a - 
form of genocide is a legitimate attitudinal 
barrier rooted in the history of the Tuske- 
Unidenttfied subject and nurse Rivers in cotton field. (Source: Centers for Disease 
Control, Atlarrta, Ga.) 
gee Syphilis Study. Many public health 
authorities who work with Black cornrnu- 
nitiesare uncomfortable responding to the sources of poor health status and social Distrust of and resistance to involve- 
issue of genocide and the Tuskegee study. inequities. Therefore, AIDS risk reduc- ment with public health programs have a 
The common response is to ignore these tion programs must be built on solid as- legitimate basis in history; to overcome 
issues. This approach may result in a loss sessments of community perceptions and these feelings will require cultural sensi- 
of believability and further alienation. One needs, and must include ongoing involve- tivity. In testimony before the National 
culturally sensitive response would be for ment of community members in program Commission on AIDS, Dr Smith stated: 
public health professionals to discuss the planning and evaluation efforts.14 
fear of genocide evoked by the AIDS ep- Successful HIV education and AIDS m e  Black] communities' perspective 
idemic. They must be willing to listen re- risk reduction will require a long-term on medical research has a historical ba- 
specdully to community fears, share the commitment from and collaboration sis which sometimes outweighs the de- 
facts of the Tuskege study when it arises among federal agencies, state and local monstrabie i n t e~ ry  and commitment of 
as a justification of those fears, and admit health departments, community-based or- individual investigators. . . In light of 
the historical basis of the suspicion of 
to the limitations of science when they do ganizations, private industry, philanthro- being guinea pig, it is particularly ironic 
not have all the answers. This approach pies, and institutions of higher learning. to hear the cries for more access to ex- 
may help public health authorities to re- Such collaboration must be based on trust pehental medicines. [This resistance] 
gain the credibility and the public trust between the agencies and the Black com- will only be overcome, frankly, with a 
they need to successfully implement HN munity. Given the IegacyofTuskegee, the more long-range effort to reassure ~ f r i -  
can Americans that they will not be the risk reduction strategies in the Black corn- credibility of public health service provid- victin?s of more Tuskegees., (p. 31) 
munity. ers from outside the Black community is 
The necessary public health science severely limited. Consequently, CDC's 
technology and experience exist For the program to provide direct funding to Black Public health professionals must sup- 
development and implementation of effec- community-based organizations (CBOs) Pan Blacks' increased access to clinical 
tive community-based HIV education to deliver HIV education represents a sig- trials SO that the AIDS knowledge base 
programs that are ethnically acceptable , nificant development in the effort to over- can be expanded and the benefits of po- 
and culturally sensitive. Strategies such as come distrust. However, while CBOs tential treatments can be realized. The 
(1) the use of program staff indigenous to may have ready access to a community successful inclusion of Blacks in clinical 
the community, (2) the use of incentives, and may have established credibility with trials will require researchers to conduct 
and (3) the delivery of health services the target population, they often lack the their investigations in convenient settings 
w i t h  the target community were used to infrastructure necessary for long-term trusted by the Black community. In addi- 
recruit participants in the Tuskegee Syph- s u c c e ~ s . ~ ~  Consequently, CBOs will re- tion, investigators must recognize that 
ilis Study. These techniques are being im- quire consistent technical assistance and simple compliance with protection of hu- 
plernented by rUDS risk reduction pro- long-range Funding From government and man subjects procedures is not sufficient. 
g rams  today.  The  va lue  o f  these  prkate agencies. Toensure that the spec- The researchers who conducted the 
community-based strategies shouid not be ter of Tuskegee will not impede progress, Tuskegee study made a bnscious deci- 
diminished by their association with the it iscrucial that decision-making power be sion to withhold information about syph- 
Tuskegee study. The impact of H3V in- distributed in such a manner that collab- ilis from participants. Consequently, 
fection and AIDS in Black communities is orating agencies allow CBOs to maintain Blacks today may not believe that they are 
exacerbated by the presence of other control over program integrity. being told the whole truth about H N .  To 
overcome the distrust of community 
members, researchers must see that they 
are Fully informed about research proce- 
dures, costs, and benefits, and that they 
have representation on research advisory 
committees. Investigators should conduct 
their work with an attitude of respect for 
the humanity of study participants, 
regardless of the social and cultural gulf 
that may exist behveen investigators and 
subjects. Ultimately, cultural sensitivity 
can best be manifested through the pro- 
fessional obligation to advocate AIDS pol- 
icies that provide for the protection of civil 
rights and access to health care s e ~ c e s . 1 3  
It must be acknowledged that public 
health research and practice operate in an 
environment influenced by societal values 
and political ideolop. For example, nee- 
dle distribution programs for intravenous 
drug usen, alongwith HIV testing policies 
and counseling of HN-infected women, 
are frequently the subject of political de- 
bate. Efforts to develop needle distribu- 
tion programs have been stymied by po- 
litical controversy, moral questions, and 
outraged claims that such progams have 
a genocidal impact on Black communities. 
In many communities where drug abuse is 
epidemic, needle distribution programs 
are perceived as contributing to the drug 
problem, particularly when such pro- 
grams are promulgated in the absence of 
access to adequate drug treatment serv- 
ices. The image of Black intravenous drug 
usen reaching out for treatment, only to 
receive clean needles from public health 
authorities, provides additional fuel for 
the genocide theory. The emphasis on  
HW testing and counseling without ade- 
quate access to clinical trials and appro- 
priate therapy for AIDS evokes memories 
of the deliberate withholding of treatment 
by the researchers in the Tuskegee study. 
Public health professionals must ensure 
that HTV testing and counseling are ac- 
companied by specific informed consent, 
full discussion of treatment options, and 
appropriate referrals for primary care and 
clinical trials. 
The reproductive rights of HIV-in- 
fected women cannot be separated from 
societal values, political ideology, moral 
issues, and concern over access to pri- 
mary health care. In an effort to prevent 
perinatal transmission, thc CDC and state 
health departments advocate HIV testing 
programs and counsel HIV-infected 
women to avoid pregnancy.16 However, 
unplernentar~on of these public health pol- 
icies in the Black community is potentially 
volatile and disastrous. The promotion of 
condoms as a means of preventing HIV 
infection is viewed with suspicion by 
Blacks. Levine and Dubler state that 
"many African Americans view any at- 
tempt to interfere with or discourage re- 
production as part of a plan for genocide" 
(p. 333).'6 If health care provides demon- 
strate a lack of sensitivity to these views 
and continue to advocate HIV testing, 
contraception, and abortion, the fears of 
B l a c b w h o  are already alienated From 
health care provide-will be reinforced. 
AIDS in the Black community must 
be understood within the broader context 
of other leading causes of preventable 
death that may result in decreased pop- 
ulation growth and decreased lifespan. 
The failure to close the gap in health sta- 
tus between White and Black Americans 
can be directly attributed to social ineq- 
uiLies and Blacks' lack of access to health 
care. George Lundberg, editor of the 
Journal of the American Medical Asso- 
ciarion, attributes this lack of access to 
long-standing, institutionalized racial dis- 
crimination.17AIthough the PHs  officials 
who conducted the Tuskegee study were 
clearly influenced by the racial prejudice 
of their time, it was their use of institu- 
tional power and resources that trans- 
formed prejudice into racism. We must 
guard against prejudicial assumptions 
about the race, class status, and lifestyle 
of people at risk for H N  infection. As 
Alan Brandt states, "the notion that sci- 
ence is a value hee discipline must be 
rejected. The need forgreaterviglance in 
assessing the specific ways in which so- 
cial values and attitudes affect profes- 
sional behavior is clearly indicated" (p. 
27).la A failure to eliminate prejudice ag- 
gressively today could lead to repressive 
AIDS policies, cloaked as  traditional 
public health practices designed to con- 
trol the epidemic. 
As the American public becomes in- 
creasingly aware of AIDS as a sigruficant 
health problem in the Black community, 
there will be both opportunity and danger. 
The oppormniry is to deal comprehen- 
sively rather than haphazardly with the 
problem as a whole: to see it as a social 
catastrophe brought on by years of eco- 
nomic deprivation and to meet it as other 
disasters are met, with adequate re- 
sources. The danger is that AIDS will be 
attributed to some innate weakness of 
Black people and used to justify Further 
negIect and ro r a t i o n h e  continued dep- 
rivation. We must be mindful that the 
AIDS epidemic has uncovered the harsh 
reality oi diminished economic resources, 
the limits of medial science, and confu- 
sion over how best to attribute responsi- 
bility for the prevention of HIV infectiol 
It is within this context that public healt 
must be used as a means for social ju: 
tice.Ig 
The AIDS epidemic has e.xposed th 
Tuskegee Syphilis Srudy as a historic: 
marker for the legitimate discontent c 
Blacks with the public health system. I 
the absence of a cure for AIDS, educatio 
remains our best chance to stop the spreal 
of HIV infection. We must discuss th ,  
feeling within the Black community ths 
AIDS is a form of genocide, a feeling jus 
tified by the historyofrheTuskegee study 
This dialogue can contribute to a bette 
understanding of how to develop and im 
plement HIV education progams that art 
scientifically sound, culturally sensitive 
and ethnically acceptable. 0 
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